Strategic blueprints, scenario analyses, policy briefs, and op-eds published continuously by our resident fellows and external contributors. Search the library, filter by format, or browse by topic. All papers are open-access; subscribers to The Long View receive embargoed previews.
The US provides 100% of Europe's mid-course missile interception, 83% of NATO's military satellites and 69% of its crewed surveillance aircraft. Europe's defence spending is rising fast, but it is buying platforms rather than the enablers that make autonomy possible.
Brussels asked Britain for EUR 6.5 billion to join a defence fund it would once have shaped for free. With Brexit costing an estimated 4% to 8% of GDP and Europe integrating fast, Labour needs to name membership as the destination rather than negotiate access piece by piece.
Europe saves more than America and invests far less. With EUR 10 trillion idle in deposits and pay-as-you-go pensions building no capital, funded reform could create up to EUR 4.1 trillion in assets by 2040 and give European companies a domestic investor base.
China and India take almost nine out of ten barrels Russia exports, buying discounted crude that cuts their own energy costs while Europe pays for sanctions. The unratified EU–India trade agreement is the leverage Europe still holds.
China buys roughly half of Russia's crude exports and anchors its trade. With US tariff powers now passed by Congress and Russian provocations on NATO's border, Beijing's choice will shape the war. Europe should make that choice costly to get wrong.
China’s subsidised industrial overcapacity is weakening Europe’s strategic sectors, from chemicals to clean tech and semiconductors. Europe needs faster trade defence, lower energy costs, and a clearer industrial doctrine to protect its economic sovereignty.
The UK’s macroeconomic weakness is not just cyclical. Brexit raised trade frictions with its largest market, while energy dependence exposed households and industry to price shocks, weakening growth, investment, productivity, and real incomes.
Europe’s startup weakness is not only regulation. The deeper problem is capital scale: smaller venture markets, weaker late-stage funding, fragmented national systems, and thinner exit markets prevent European startups from scaling at US speed.
Europe’s 2025 goods surplus masked a nearly €299bn energy trade deficit. Without imported fossil fuels, the EU’s goods balance would have been far stronger. Electrification and a real single energy market are now central to Europe’s external strength, industrial competitiveness, and strategic autonomy.
The EU’s Savings and Investments Union could unlock trillions in underused household savings, deepen capital markets, lower financing costs, and help close Europe’s annual investment gap. If fully implemented, it would strengthen innovation, resilience, and competitiveness against the US and China.
